Hardware Podcasts

038 - My Favorite Random Number is 5

Unnamed Reverse Engineering Podcast · 23 Aug 2020 · 1h 15m

What this episode covers

Colin O'Flynn, founder of NewAE Technology, explains how differential power analysis (DPA) and fault injection allow attackers to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices by measuring minute power variations or disrupting clock/voltage signals. He details the mechanics of side-channel attacks, the importance of random number generation, and the limitations of 'military grade' encryption claims. O'Flynn also discusses his open-source tool ChipWhisperer, electromagnetic fault injection hardware like BADFET, and the broader industry challenges in securing IoT devices against such physical attacks.

Most relevant to

companies scaling up

Topics

Mentioned

Companies
NewAE Technology, Muddy Waters Research, Atmel, Microchip, Swanstrom Tools
Products
ChipWhisperer, BADFET, ChipSHOUTER, PhyWhisperer-USB, LUNA Project, OpenVizla, Beagle480
Tools
Segger J-Trace, Orbuculum
Also
Paul Kocher, Travis Goodspeed, Kate Temkin

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